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A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE
CHANGING DEFINITION OF A REFUGEE
Todd Howland*
INTRODUCTION
It is difficult to pinpoint exactly who is a refugee. Oddly
enough, in this instance international law constrains the analysis
instead of clarifying it.
Scholarly discussions of refugee law are limited mostly to
the "Convention" refugee,' although scholars are beginning to
discuss other possible international bases for the protection of
refugees.2 To a large extent this discussion is academic, and fails
* Staff attorney, El Rescate Legal Services, 2675 W. Olympic Blvd., Los Angeles,
California 90006. The author would like to thank Liz Guillen, Watson Galleher, Ved
Nanda and Sara Seibert for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article and Iona
Bocikis, Barb Cashman, Charlotte Flach, Debra Kreisberg, Alexandra Mann, Caroline
Mecary, Lauri Railas, and Camino Yoldi for providing information otherwise
unavailable.
1. E.g., Sexton, Political Refugees, Nonrefoulement and State Practice: A Compara-
tive Study, 18 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 731 (1985).
These discussions are based on the law which grew out of the 1951 Convention,
signed by the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees
and Stateless Persons. The Convention defined a refugee as a person who:
as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded
fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of
a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nation-
ality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the
protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside
the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable
or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (entered
into force Apr. 21, 1954), reprinted in 19 U.S.T. 6223, 6261 (1968) [hereinafter
Convention].
This definition of a refugee arose from the dominance of the Western powers at a
time when political rights were given complete prominence over economic rights, and
when the Cold War and the real or imagined communist threat were powerful considera-
tions. Fong, Some Legal Aspects of the Search for Admission into Other States of Per-
sons Leaving the Indo-Chinese Peninsula in Small Boats, 52 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 53, 94
(1981).
2. These discussions have attempted to fashion two separate legal bases for the pro-
tection of refugees: 1) the 1951 Geneva Convention and its 1967 Protocol on Refugees,
and 2) the 1949 Geneva Convention and its 1977 Protocol, which deal with the plight of
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to address the reality in which we live. The "Convention" refu-
gee definition grew out of a past era. Its strict application today
can be used by states as a legal crutch to legitimize policies that
do not provide refuge to those in need. Currently, the body of
international law used to protect refugees is inadequate on two
accounts: first, the law does not adequately reflect the fact that
refugees are persons who have been deprived of their fundamen-
tal human rights; second, the applied law fails to address ade-
quately the problem of refugee flow.
Most people think of a refugee as someone who flees for
safety, because of natural disasters, civil war, gross human rights
abuses, or political persecution (individual or group).3 Some
states are beginning to recognize that many of today's refugees
do not fit perfectly into the legal category created by the 1951
Geneva Convention. These states are beginning to see how
human rights are related not only to accepting refugees, but to
refugee flow. 4 This interconnectedness can be seen in these
states' gradual movement toward internationalization of their
refugee policies.
The problem is vast.5 Most contemporary work in the area
civilians during wartime. See, e.g., Solf, Protection of Civilians Against the Effects of
Hostilities Under Customary International Law and Under Protocol I, 1 AM. U. J. INT'L
L. & POL'Y 117 (1986) (discussion of the 1949 Geneva Convention and its Protocol). For
discussions of refugee protection from two separate legal bases, see Perluss & Hartman,
Temporary Refuge: Emergence of a Customary Norm, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 551 (1986);
Hailbronner, Non-Refoulement and "Humanitarian" Refugees: Customary Interna-
tional Law or Wishful Legal Thinking? 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 857 (1986).
3. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 964 (1979). The common definition is con-
gruent with reality. According to an official of the United Nations High Commission for
Refugees (UNHCR), those fleeing war and starvation make up the bulk of the world's
refugees. See 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 12).
4. This movement is also gaining some momentum at the international level. After
years of unwillingness by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) to get involved in the difficult area of refugee creation, the UN is finally be-
ginning to act. See Kennedy, International Refugee Protection, 8 HUM. RTS. Q. 1 (1986);
Garvey, Toward a Reformulation of International Refugee Law, 26 HARV. INT'L L. J. 483
(1985); but see Report of Group of Governmental Experts on International Co-opera-
tion to Avert New Flows of Refugees, U.N. Doc. A/41/324 (1986).
5. Currently, it is estimated that there are in excess of 10 million refugees worldwide.
REFUGEES, Oct. 1985, at 5. The U.S. Committee for Refugees estimates the figure is
10,261,000. Refugee Commission Struggles to Keep up With the Flow, N.Y. Times, Feb.
16, 1986, § 4 (Week in Review), at 3, col. 1 (chart at col. 5). Another estimate assumes
that there are seven million refugees within the jurisdiction of UNHCR, and another
three and a half million persons displaced within their own countries. Grahl-Madsen,
Refugees and Refugee Law in a World in Transition, 1982 MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD.
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is plagued by a misplaced emphasis. The crux of the problem is
not how to help the "poor" refugees,6 or how to urge countries to
open their doors wider when pressed with compassion fatigue,7
or how to eradicate the racism and xenophobia refugees face in
the host countries.' Those issues are symptoms of a greater
problem, the lack of a global consciousness.' Refugees are a
global problem, and the problem requires a new framework and
a new political language to eradicate it."°
65, 66 [hereinafter Grahl-Madsen, World in Transition].
6. Often people react to refugees as if they were somehow unfortunate victims of
chance. This is only applicable in natural disaster situations. Most often people become
refugees as a result of a political situation that was created by actions of governments. A
majority of people become refugees as a result of individual and governmental action or
inaction.
The refugee is someone entitled to respect. The first UN High Commissioner for
Refugees stated:
The refugee problem has nothing to do with charity. It is not the problem of
people to be pitied: far more of people to be admired. It is a problem of people
who, somewhere, somehow, sometime, had the courage to give up the feeling of
belonging which they possessed, rather than abandon the human freedom which
they wanted more highly.
Quoted in Nanda, World Refugee Assistance: The Role of International Law and Insti-
tutions, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 449, 474 (1981).
7. Some scholars see global resource limitations and the international economic
downturn as the cause of "compassion fatigue." Grahl-Madsen, World in Transition,
supra note 5, at 65.
8. Refugee xenophobia is exemplified in the writings of Richard Lamm. E.g., Lamm,
Refugees: Close the Door, in REFUGEES (V. Nanda & G. Sheperd eds. forthcoming); R.
LAMM & G. IMHOFF, IMMIGRATION TIME BOMB: THE FRAGMENTING OF AMERICA (1985); R.
LAMM, MEGATRAUMAS: AMERICA AT THE YEAR 2000 (1985).
9. Often nations seek a domestic solution to the international problem; they do not
connect the fact that when a State breaks international law as a matter of convenience
(e.g., by intervention, aggression, or warfare against another state), basic human rights
are violated. This motivates people to flee. "It is utopian, though, to believe that the
hardships suffered by more than twelve million refugees and displaced persons would
appeal so strongly to the consciences of those who decide the destiny of the world that
they would abandon those practices which generate the masses of refugees." Grahl-Mad-
sen, World in Transition, supra note 5, at 68.
10. The importance of establishing a just world order to rectify many of contempo-
rary society's most difficult issues has been stressed by Richard Falk. See Falk, Solving
the Puzzles of Global Reform, 11 ALTERNATIVES 45 (1986). One critic of the call for global
consciousness argues that such a call is unrealistic given the nation state system, and
that the end product of such a call will only serve to benefit the Soviet Union. Coll, The
Limits of Global Consciousness and Legal Absolutism: Protecting International Law
From Some of Its Best Friends, 27 HARV. INT'L L.J. 599, 605 (1986). Coll's argument fails
to address the fact that those calling for global consciousness have rejected the East-
West paradigm and have sought a more reflective model to use when confronted with
global problems such as underdevelopment. See, e.g., Myrdal, The "Soft State" in Un-
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Who is a refugee, and how to deal with refugees must be
rethought to begin a reversal of the ever-increasing refugee
flow." The international community has balked; the harsh criti-
cism and action needed in the area has been derailed by political
gamesmanship. 12 Some states recognize the current deficiency in
the international legal regime and are acting to adjust their laws
and practices by simply interpreting the relevant international
instruments in a contemporary context.'8
This comparison of the changing definition of a refugee will
focus on two aspects of current refugee law and practice: 1) the
reflection in each country's laws of a more appropriate definition
of a refugee and the application of this definition in the contem-
porary environment; and 2) the internationalization of each
country's policies, in order to adjust to the interconnectedness of
refugee creation and refugee flow (e.g., the relationship between
foreign policy and refugee flow).
derdeveloped Countries, 15 UCLA L. REV. 1118 (1968).
11. Refugee flows have increased rapidly in recent years, a pattern expected to con-
tinue in the future. Suhrke, Global Refugee Movements and Strategies of Response, U.S.
IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY: GLOBAL AND DOMESTIC ISSUES 157 (M. Kritz ed. 1983).
12. Previous efforts by the international community to redefine refugee law, and a
State's obligation under it, have met with limited success, in the 1967 Declaration on
Territorial Asylum, G.A. Res. 2312, 22 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16), at 81, U.N. Doc. A/
6716, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 822 (1967); and the ill-fated United Nations Convention on Ter-
ritorial Asylum, U.N. Doc. A/10177 (1975). See Nayar, The Right of Asylum in Interna-
tional Law: Its Status and Prospects, 17 ST. Louis U.L.J. 17 (1972) (extensive discussion
of the Declaration); Plender, Admission of Refugees: Draft Convention on Territorial
Asylum, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 45 (1977) (extensive discussion of the Draft Convention);
see also Weis, The Draft United Nations Convention on Territorial Asylum, 50 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 151 (1979).
In 1977 the Council of Europe adopted a Declaration on Territorial Asylum, which
stated: "In fulfilling their humanitarian duties, the Member States of the Council of Eu-
rope reaffirm their intention to maintain their liberal attitude with regards to persons
seeking asylum on their territory. ... Declaration on Territorial Asylum, by the Com-
mittee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, reprinted in UNHCR, Collection of Inter-
national Instruments Concerning Refugees 306 (2d ed. 1979).
13. The 1951 Geneva Convention, in combination with the 1949 Geneva Convention,
can be interpreted to cover many current refugees, including those fleeing gross human
rights abuses, wars of liberation, and racist attacks. Many well-documented articles show
how a non-typical case can fit within either Geneva Convention and thus necessitate
refuge for the fleeing individual. See, e.g., Hyndman, The 1951 Convention Definition of
Refugee: An Appraisal with Particular Reference to the Case of Sri Lankan Tamil Ap-
plicants, 9 HUM. RTS. Q. 49 (1987).
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I. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND STANDARDS
Most discussions of the international law of refugees are
limited to the 1951 Convention of the Status of Refugees and
the 1967 Protocol. These instruments define who is a refugee, 4
and when nonrefoulement is required. 15 These discussions
largely overlook the fact that other bodies of international law
protect those who are commonly thought of as refugees, includ-
ing: the 1949 Geneva Convention, disaster relief law, and human
rights law.'" Some thoroughly documented and well argued at-
tempts have been made in both the judicial and academic arenas
to obtain acceptance of the application of these bodies of law to
14. The 1967 Protocol removes the temporal limits from the 1951 definition. Protocol
relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 1, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 6225 art. I, § 2 (entered
into force Oct. 4, 1967) [hereinafter Protocol]. It now applies to any person who
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, na-
tionality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside
the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to
avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality
and being outside the country of his former habitual residence is unable or, ow-
ing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
Protocol at 6261, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 art. 1(A)(2).
15. Nonrefoulement: "No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refu-
gee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom
would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a partic-
ular social group or political opinion." Protocol at 6276, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 art. 33.
16. There are three other legal bases for refugee protection: humanitarian law (pro-
tects those fleeing war), disaster victims, and the entire body of human rights law. Of the
three, humanitarian law has received the most attention. Results of this attention in-
clude the Geneva Conventions I-IV of 1949 (specifically, provisions for the protection of
civilians in a time of armed conflict), 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 5; the 1977 Protocols I
and II Additional to the 1949 Geneva Convention, U.N. Doc. A/32/144 (1977), 72 AM. J.
INT'L L. 457 (1978); Resolution on Basic Principles for the Protection of Civilian Popu-
lations in Armed Conflicts, G.A. Res. 2675, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 76, U.N.
Doc. A/8028 (1970); Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development. of
International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflict 1974-1977, 9 CASE W.
REs. J. INT'L L. 9 (1977); 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons,
360 U.N.T.S. 117 (1960); 1961 Convention of the Reduction of Statelessness, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf. 9/S.R.15 (1961); 1957 Hague Agreement Relating to Refugee Seamen, 506
U.N.T.S. 125 (1964); Report of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, U.N. Doc. A/
32/12 (1977).
For an extensive discussion of the international law (or lack thereof) that protects
refugees created by a natural disaster, see Parker, Victims of Natural Disasters in U.S.
Refugee Law and Policy, 1982 MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 137. The protection of refu-
gees under human rights instruments is not explicit; this area will be discussed through-
out the paper.
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refugees. 17
Refugee analysis relying on the 1951 or 1949 Geneva Con-
vention falls into the so-called "old school" of thought in inter-
national law in which sovereign states are the only entities which
have international personality.' 8 Under this approach a contra-
diction arises. Although international law defines who is a refu-
gee, the sovereign state defines who may be granted asylum. Us-
ing this construction, no "right" to asylum exists, because the
decision whether a refugee meets the international standard is
left to the individual state.' Effective arguments, however, have
been made that an individual has the right to nonrefoulement
(either under article 33 of the 1967 Protocol or the 1949 Geneva
Conventions). Such arguments have succeeded by showing that
because the international instruments are self-executing, the
state parties are bound to the instruments' terms upon signa-
ture.2 0 While these are positive steps, these arguments are lim-
ited by their underpinnings. The sovereign may agree that a
right to nonrefoulement exists, but it is still the sovereign that
17. Especially noteworthy are the attempts to apply the 1949 Geneva Convention,
which gives an individual the right to flee armed conflict when caught in the cross-fire.
See Parker, Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, 7 WHITT. L. REv. 675 (1985); Parker,
Geneva Convention Protections for Salvadoran Refugees-An International Law De-
fense against Deportation and a Justification for Sanctuary, 13 NAT'L LAW. GUILD IM-
MIGR. NEWSL. (May-June 1984); see also Perluss & Hartman, supra note 2; and see
Fleiner-Gerster & Meyer, New Developments in Humanitarian Law: A Challenge to the
Concept of Sovereignty, 34 INT'L & ComP. L.Q. 267 (1985) (discussion of the application
of humanitarian law to the traditional notion of sovereignty).
As to the application of the 1949 Geneva Convention to internal strife, see
Silverburg, Sanctuary and Irregular Warfare: Contortive International Law, 28
CHiTTY'S L.J. 195 (1980). The principles apply in both international and internal warfare,
even to guerrilla warfare and struggles for independence. See Aldrich, Progressive Devel-
opments of the Laws of War: A Reply to Criticisms of the 1977 Geneva Protocol I, 26
VA. J. INT'L L. 693, 700 (1986).
18. See T.O. ELIAS, NEw HORIZONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1979) (extensive discus-
sion of the development of international law).
19. No right to asylum can be found in international law. The 1948 Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights states: "[elveryone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other
countries asylum from persecution." Universal Declaration of Human Rights 3 U.N.
GAOR I, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). This "right" is meaningless, unless the sovereign
grants the person asylum. Gilbert, Right of Asylum: A Change of Direction, 32 INT'L &
ComP. L.Q. 633 (1983).
20. This is the approach that defense counsel in the Tucson sanctuary trials at-
tempted to use. See Helton, Cohan, Kronowitz, Pope & Valenica-Weber, Ecumenical,
Municipal and Legal Challenges to United States Refugee Policy, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 493, 503-517 (1986).
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decides if the particular case is within the area that triggers the
obligation.2 1
An alternative approach must be used to guarantee fair
treatment of all refugees. The so-called "new school" of thought
in international law recognizes that the true subjects of interna-
tional law are not the metaphysical entities of the state, but in-
dividual human beings.2 2 The entire area of human rights law is
an outgrowth of this trend. Human rights protect individuals no
matter where they may be, inside their country of origin or in-
side a foreign country. 3 A prominent international legal scholar
points out that upon examination of human rights documents it
becomes apparent that the legal personality of human beings is
a significant feature of contemporary international law.2 4 Thus,
international human rights law can theoretically provide mean-
ingful protection to a refugee without the usual difficulties en-
countered with sovereignty.2 5 For in human rights we are all
members of the world community, and it is the community that
must ensure that we all live with dignity and safety.2
Under the human rights regime, individuals are entitled to
enumerated fundamental rights.2 7 Human rights, such as basic
economic, political, social, and cultural rights, have risen to the
21. This argument has met with mixed results in the United States. In an interview
with Cheryl Martinez, Director of the Denver Central American Refugee Project, in Den-
ver, Colorado (Jan. 20, 1987), Ms. Martinez related the Denver Immigration Judge's
statement that he did not believe an armed conflict that fell within the 1949 Geneva
Conventions existed in El Salvador, but if he believed that such a conflict existed, he
would consider the nonrefoulement argument valid.
22. 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF HERSCH LAUTERPACHT 147-49
(E. Lauterpacht ed. 1970).
23. Goldman & Martin, International Legal Standards Relating to the Rights of
Aliens and Refugees and United States Immigration Law, 5 HuM. RTS. Q. 302 (1983).
This contention is supported by article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
24. Elias, New Perspectives and Conceptions in Contemporary Public International
Law, 10 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'y 409, 411 (1981). This idea is surIported in L. HENKIN,
How NATIONS BEHAVE (1979); and Eide, The Human Rights Movement and the Trans-
formation of the International Order, 11 ALTERNATIVES 367 (1986).
25. See Young, Between Sovereigns: A Reexamination of the Refugee's Status, 1982
MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 339 (treatment of human rights law as the basis for refu-
gees' rights).
26. Hyndman, Refugees Under International Law With a Reference to the Concept
of Asylum, 60 AUSTRALIAN L.J. 148 (1986).
27. See generally W. LAQUEUR & B. RUBIN, THE HUMAN RIGHTS READER (1979); see
also M.S. McDOUGAL, H.D. LASSWELL & L.C. CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER (1980).
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level of customary international law and, therefore, bind all
states.28 There is also growing acceptance of the idea that all in-
dividuals have the right to develop their full potential as human
beings.2 Thus, using the human rights approach, the definition
28. For example, see the following provisions:
The States parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an
adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food,
clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions
.... The State Parties . . . recognize the right to work, which includes the
right of everyone to the opportunity to gain his living by work which he freely
chooses or accepts.
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 Annex,
21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
"Every human being has the inherent right to life . . . . No one shall be subjected to
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment . . . . Everyone has
the right to liberty and security of person . . . . Everyone shall have the right to recogni-
tion everywhere as a person before the law." International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 Annex, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/
6316 (1966).
While the above provisions do constitute customary international law because of the
number of countries which have become signatories to the Covenants, a vast difference
exists between the law and international practice. See HUMAN DIGNITY: THE INTERNATION-
ALIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (A. Henkin ed. 1979).
29. Often the concept of right to development is looked upon as a right of a develop-
ing state to economic development. This ambiguity is created by some authors attempt-
ing to give a state a human right. The right to development discussed in this paper refers
to developing the entire individual: a person has the right to material and non-material
items/conditions that are essential for self-realization. See Baxi, The New International
Economic Order, Basic Needs and Rights: Notes Towards Development of the Right to
Development, 23 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 225 (1983); Nanda, Development as an Emerging
Human Right Under International Law, 13 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 161 (1984); HUMAN
RIGHTS AND BASIC NEEDS IN THE AMERICAS (M. Crahan ed. 1982).
It is more appropriate to see the right to development as the legal framework for
economic development. The right to development mandates that certain aspects of an
individual's life cannot be sacrificed for growth in a country's Gross National Product
(GNP). The right to development does not mandate any particular economic system or
means to development. As long as an individual's fundamental rights are met, economic
development can occur through a capitalist, socialist, or communist growth model, or the
Basic Needs method which rejects the logic of the growth models. There is a great deal
of literature, debate, and confusion concerning economic development. See M. BRONFEN-
BRENNER, W. SICHEL & W. GARDNER, ECONOMICS 369-82 (1984); H.H. VILLARD, ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT (1959); N. BUKHARIN, IMPERIALISM AND WORLD ECONOMY (1929). For a criti-
cal overview of the ideas of underdevelopment and growth, see Samater, From "Growth"
to "Basic Needs" The Evolution of Development Theory, 36(5) MONTHLY REV. 1 (1984).
The interaction of the right to development and economic development is also de-
bated. See Theberge, Law and Economic Development, 9 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 231
(1980) (argues that development does not and should not mean the wholesale importa-
tion of western values); but see Valdez, Legal Development and Social Change in Latin
America and the Caribbean, 62 A.B.A. J. 484 (1976).
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of a refugee would no longer be constricted to political persecu-
tion.30 Accordingly, a state must allow for, or provide for, condi-
tions in which physical security, vital subsistence, liberty of po-
litical participation and physical movement are possible.
Beneath this threshold, the basic social compact or bond be-
tween individual and sovereign is lost.31 Refugees exist when: 1)
individuals are deprived of their fundamental rights; 2) individ-
uals have taken action in reliance on international institutions;
and 3) when no recourse to individuals' home governments is
possible.32 To send individuals back to their homeland when
these three conditions exist would be a violation of the refugees'
human rights."3
The fundamental rights approach definition of a refugee,
which is grounded in human rights law, reflects today's reality.34
30. The rationale for this position argues that "a necessitous individual is not a free
individual." See Rubin, Economic and Social Human Rights and the New International
Economic Order, 1 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 67 (1986); see also Paust, Aggression
Against Authority: The Crime of Oppression, Politicide and Other Crimes Against
Human Rights, 18 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 283 (1986) (discussion of human rights viola-
tions that also lead to refugee flows).
31. Shacknove, Who is a Refugee?-95 ETHICS 274, 281 (1985); see H. SHUE, BASIC
RIGHTS-SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (1980); see also Grahl-Mad-
sen, Protection of Refugees by Their County of Origin, 11 YALE J. INT'L L. 362 (1986)
(related alternative approach to the refugee problem).
32. Shacknove, supra note 31, at 282.
33. Some may claim that this definition is overbroad and unworkable. While this def-
inition does encompass many more people than the Convention definition, the problem
is not overbreadth, but instead it is disarray in world order. At present, all states are
bound by human rights law. The implementation of these laws varies by country. In
Europe, enforcement is better than most other regions because of the European Human
Rights Court. See L. MIKAELSEN, EUROPEAN PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1980); see
also M. Pellonpaeae, Expulsion in International Law-A Study in International Aliens
Law and Human Rights with Special Reference to Finland, ANNALES ACADEMIAE SCIEN-
TIARUM FENNicAE-DISSERTATIONES HUMANARUM LITTERARUM 39 (Helsinki 1984) (exten-
sive treatment of the relationship between refuge and human rights).
34. This is not to say that if states interpreted the current law liberally, as the
UNHCR suggests, that the law would adequately protect all refugees. See UNHCR,
Handbook on Procedure and Criterion For Determining Refugee Status Under the 1951
Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1979). Coherent
and well-reasoned arguments can be made to show how all refugees, whether fleeing war,
gross human rights abuses, coups, natural disasters, or political persecution, can fit
within the definition. See Tsamenyi, The "Boat People": Are They Refugees? 5 HUM.
RTs. Q. 348 (1983). The problem is that the treatment of refugees would still be limited
to sovereign privilege and discretion. Grounding the treatment of refugees in human
rights is necessary to avoid abuse of discretion by a government, and to make govern-
ments understand that their actions have an impact on refugee flows.
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The Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention Gov-
erning the Special Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa incor-
porates many of the fundamental rights ideas into its definition
of a refugee:
[E]very person who, owing to external aggression, occu-
pation, foreign domination, or events seriously disturbing
public order in either part or the whole of his country of
origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of
habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another
place outside his country of origin or nationality. 5
While no African nation is included in this article's analy-
sis,s' the article investigates how non-parties to the OAU Con-
vention are adjusting their law and practices to reflect the fun-
damental rights approach highlighted in the OAU Convention.
II. COMPARISON OF REFUGEE LAW AND PRACTICE
United States.
7
Scholars have posited that the United States is the most
generous country in the world with respect to the acceptance of
refugees."5 This statement could only be true if the greatest
35. OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa,
8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1288-98 (1969).
36. For an extensive treatment of the refugee problem and responses in Africa, see
Nanda, The African Refugee Dilemma: A Challenge for International Law and Policy,
32 AFRICA TODAY, 61 (1985). For the most part African nations have kept to their obliga-
tions under the OAU even though the refugee situation there is extreme. See Hailbron-
ner, supra note 2, at 877.
37. To understand a domestic issue it is often useful to see how municipal legal sys-
tems form relationships with international law and trends, rather than simply comparing
dry legal procedures. In order to highlight the relationship of the United States to inter-
national law and trends, a comparative analysis was conducted for other countries with
similar legal traditions and/or economic well-being. See Butler, Comparative Ap-
proaches to International Law, 190 RECUEIL DE COURS 9 (1985).
38. "The United States is the most generous country in the world in admitting immi-
grants and refugees for permanent resettlement. In 1980, the United States admitted
800,000 immigrants and refugees, more than twice as many as were admitted by the rest
of the world combined." LeMaster & Zall, Compassion Fatigue: The Expansion of Refu-
gee Admissions to the U.S., 6 B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 447 (1983). "Today, immigra-
tion to the United States is massive, and it is out of control. The United States accepts
for permanent resettlement twice as many immigrants as do all the other countries of
the world combined." R. LAMM & G. IMHOFF. THE IMMIGRATION TIME BOMB 1 (1985).
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sheer number is equivalent to most generous. 9
The United States is a party to the 1967 Protocol to the
1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees, and is
thereby bound to both the 1951 and 1967 agreements.40 With
the passage of the 1980 Refugee Act, the United States adopted
the wording of the Convention definition.41 United States refu-
gee law can be subdivided into four areas: refugee resettlement,
Extended Voluntary Departure, political asylum, and withhold-
ing of deportation.2
In numbers of people, the United States refugee program
consists almost completely of the refugee resettlement pro-
39. "Generous" is a value-laden term. It does not account for a country's self-interest
in its policy, nor does one accurate measure reflect that quality. Many countries could
dispute the claim that the United States is most generous. Many African and Central
American countries take in more refugees in proportion to Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) than the United States does, and some countries take in more refugees per capita
(e.g., Australia and Canada). See Martin, The Refugee Act of 1980: Its Past and Future,
1982 MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 91 (discussion of the numerical limits of American
generosity); Delli Sante, Central American Refugees: A Consequence of War and Social
Upheaval, 15 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y (to be published in the 1987 issue).
40. Convention and Protocol, 19 U.S.T. 6223; see also Hagel, Alien's Rights-the
Refugee Act of 1980 as a Response to the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refu-
gees: the First Test, 14 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 561 (1981) (detailed discussion of U.S.
obligations under the 1967 Protocol).
41. In spite of the wording in the 1980 Act, the United States still did not consider
itself a country of first refuge, and continued to believe that it would be able to pick and
choose which refugees to accept. The previous bias of presuming that all refugees who
are in the United States who apply for political asylum are economic migrants continues.
Aleinikoff, Political Asylum in the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of
France: Lessons for the United States, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 183 (1984).
It should be noted that since early U.S. refugee law, refugees from communist coun-
tries have been favored. Only since 1965 has it been possible to be a refugee under U.S.
law by fleeing an ideology other than communism; the ideological and geographical pref-
erences were only removed from the law in 1980. See Kurzban, A Critical Analysis of
Refugee Law, 36 U. MIAMI L. REV. 865, 867-69 (1982) (citing U.S. refugee/immigration
law from 1921, 1948, 1950, 1953, and 1965 to support this contention).
Empirical data support the hypothesis that the Executive Branch's discretionary im-
plementation of U.S. refugee law has solidified the past ideological practices. The result
is that less than 5% of the refugees who were admitted to the United States have a non-
communist country of origin. Id. at 879.
42. This discussion does not include attaining refugee status through: a Private Bill,
Parole, or Emergency Legislation. All three are discretionary and all three are unlikely.
There is no formalized application process, nor is there any appeal. Private bills and
emergency legislation require influence on Capitol Hill, and most refugees do not have
such influence. Parole supposedly was eliminated with the passage of the 1980 Act, but it
has been used since 1980 in cases of large influxes of refugees, e.g., the Cuban boatlift.
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gram.'8 In this discretionary program, the President sets out nu-
merical quotas for different regions, and then applicants from
those regions are screened to see if they fit within the Conven-
tion definition." Thus, refugees who do not fit within the narrow
Convention definition of refugee may gain refugee status if they
are from the "correct" region.
The relief of Extended Voluntary Departure (EVD) is the
United States version of nonrefoulement with the exception that
in the refugee resettlement program no automatic right to EVD
exists. Rather, EVD is granted by executive discretion as a privi-
lege from the sovereign." Experience with EVD shows that the
United States often applies a standard broader than the Con-
vention definition and the Convention nonrefoulement provision
of article 33. EVD has been granted following coups and during
armed conflicts, allowing refugees to stay in the United States
43. The term "refugee" means (A) any person who is outside any country of such
person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside
any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or
unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of
the protection of, thatcountry because of persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion, or (B) in such special circumstances as the
President after appropriate consultation may specify, any person who is within
the country of such person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no
nationality, within the country in which such person is habitually residing, and
who is persecuted or who has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion. The term "refugee" does not include any person who ordered, incited,
assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.
Immigration and Nationality Act, 66 Stat. 163 as added by Act of Sept. 26, 1961, Pub. L.
No. 87-301, 75 Stat. 651, (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1986)) [hereinafter
INA].
44. See Martin, supra note 39, at 111-12 (detailed discussion of the workings of the
resettlement program, and ways in which standards applied in resettlement are more lax
than in asylum cases).
45. At times, administrators of the refugee resettlement program pay little or no at-
tention to the specification in the law that the person applying for refugee status is ap-
plying because of political persecution. See, e.g., Suhrke, A New Look at America's Refu-
gee Policy, 10 INDOCHINA ISSUES 1 (Sept. 1980); D. GALLAGHER, S. FORBES & P.W. FAGEN,
OF SPECIAL HUMANITARIAN CONCERN: U.S. REFUGEE ADMISSIONS SINCE PASSAGE OF THE
REFUGEE ACT (1985).
46. See T. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN, IMMIGRATION PROCESS AND POLICY (1985), § D, at
726, 727 n.30, 728-43 (citing INS policy memorandum found in Interp. Rel., 61 American
Council for Nationalities Service No. 6, at 103 (Feb. 10, 1984)).
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until conditions improve in their home country."' Bias in favor
of granting EVD to communist-dominated countries has been
asserted, but the courts are unwilling to force the executive into
setting out objective criteria for the EVD grant.4"
Related are two other forms of relief, political asylum 49 and
withholding of deportation.5 0 The difference between them is a
matter of timing.5 1 To apply for political asylum, one usually
"affirmatively files" or voluntarily presents a claim to the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service (INS) (at the border or inside
the United States). Withholding of deportation is relief available
only when a person is subject to deportation proceedings. With-
holding deportation could be considered a political asylum claim
to prevent deportation. Given INS practices, only recently could
either claim be considered a right.2
In political asylum and withholding of deportation cases,
two aspects are determinative: the burden of proof placed on the
47. EVD has been used on 15 occasions since 1960, to refugees from countries which
have included Ethiopia, Uganda, Poland, Iran, Afghanistan, and Nicaragua. See T.
Aleinikoff & D. Martin, supra note 46, at 728.
48. A recent case brought by El Salvadorans attempted to force the executive into
setting out standards. The EVD claim was denied because the court did not want to
"impose a humanitarian standard on the Attorney General," nor did the court want "to
open up irresponsibly the floodgates to illegal aliens." Hotel & Restaurant Employees
Union, Local 25 v. Smith, 594 F. Supp. 502, 508 (1984).
Denial of temporary refuge to those fleeing war conditions is a violation of the 1949
Geneva Convention. Weiner, The Agony and the Exodus: Deporting Salvadorans in Vi-,
olation of the Fourth Geneva Convention, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 703 (1986).
49. Political asylum applicants must show they are refugees as defined in the statute:
any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in the case
of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person
last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable
or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because
of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.
INA § 101(a)(42)(A) (1980).
50. "The Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien ... to a country if
the Attorney General determines that such alien's life or freedom would be threatened in
such country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion." INA § 243(h)(1) (1980).
51. An unsuccessful affirmative request for political asylum will result in deportation
proceedings. Once deportation proceedings begin, the individual's political asylum appli-
cation collapses into an application for withholding of deportation.-
52. Under current law, undocumented persons subject to deportation must be in-
formed of their right to apply for political asylum or, where more appropriate, withhold-
ing of deportation. See, e.g., Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351, 376-78 (C.D.
Cal. 1982).
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applicant, and the mandatory consideration of an application by
the State Department. Within the burden of proof issue, a pre-
sumption has arisen that an applicant from a communist coun-
try has a legitimate political asylum or withholding of deporta-
tion claim if the applicant is from a communist country, but
that an applicant from a non-communist country is an economic
migrant." The burden of proof issue was modified recently by
the Supreme Court decision in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca" Prior
to Cardoza-Fonseca, no real distinction existed in the burden of
proof for a political asylum or withholding of deportation
claim.5 The new Supreme Court ruling leaves unclear whether a
distinction will result in the application of the two forms of
relief.56
While progress may have been made on the burden of proof
issue by the recent Supreme Court decision, whether the State
Department consultation process is objective or politically
53. It is unclear whether this presumption is official policy. Statistics indicate severe
bias on the basis of ideology. See Koehn, Selected Political Issues and Problems in U.S.
Immigration Law and Policy, 16 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y (to be published in the 1987
issue). Many INS Districts do use a presumption in favor of individuals fleeing commu-
nist countries. See, e.g., Key Federal Aide Refuses to Deport Any Nicaraguans-Cites
Sandinista Cruelty- Official in Florida Acts as U.S. Drafts Plan on Refugees of Com-
munist Countries, N.Y. Times, April 17, 1986, at Al, col. 1; however, this is not the only
area of immigration law that still is affected by an ideological hangover. See Note, The
Ideological Exclusion of Invited Aliens: Should the United States Require a Higher
Level of Tolerance By Its Citizens Than It Must Demonstrate Itself?, 1 GEORGETOWN
IMMIG. L.J. 61 (1985).
54. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. 1207 (1987). Perhaps the new decision will
result in an interpretation of the 1980 Act that is more consistent with international
Conventions. E.g., Note, Membership in a Social Group: Salvadoran Refugees and the
1980 Refugee Act, 8 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 305 (1985).
55. On its face, the withholding law seems to be more generous than the affirmative
filing law, and it seemingly mandates non-refoulement; in reality, interpretations of the
two sections of the Act have varied. Steinberg, The Standard of Proof in Asylum Cases
After INS v. Stevic, 13 NAT'L LAW. GUILD IMMIGR. NEwSL. (July-Aug. 1984). The Su-
preme Court tackled the discrepancies in applications in Stevic, stating in dicta that the
standard for withholding was actually stricter than that of affirmative filings, INS v.
Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 425 (1984); however, the distinction drawn by the Court has been
ignored and the current standards of review are basically the same for the two forms of
relief. Most jurisdictions require the refugee to prove that it is more likely than not that
she will be singled out for persecution (i.e., a clear probability of persecution) upon re-
turn to her country of origin, based on any of the enumerated Convention factors. See,
e.g., Development, Immigration Policy and Rights of Aliens, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1286, 1355
(1983).
56. Taylor, High Court Rules U.S. Must Ease Rule in Granting Political Asylum,
N.Y. Times, March 10, 1987, at Al, col. 3.
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tainted remains a crucial issue that dominates United States ref-
ugee law. 57 Not only do practitioners believe that the State De-
partment's advisory opinions are politically biased, but some
Justice Department employees see the entire process as a politi-
cal decision."
Appeal is possible only from an unsuccessful determination
of refugee status in a deportation hearing, before an immigration
judge.59 No appeal is available from a denial of an overseas re-
settlement claim, EVD, or affirmative request for political
asylum.10
Oddly, the United States appears to be in a kind of time
warp. Although a party to the 1967 Protocol, the United States
insists upon applying the 1951 Convention definition premised
upon the assumption that fleeing communism is equivalent to
fleeing political persecution. 1
57. The rationale for having to consult the State Department on every application is
that neither the INS District Director nor the Immigration Judge is likely to have any
expertise in situations involving refugees or the conditions existing in foreign countries,
and the regulation assumes that the advisory opinion from the State Department's Bu-
reau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (BHRHA) would be better informed on
the issue. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.7 and 208.10(b) (1987).
58. A letter from Peter Nowinski, United States Attorney, Eastern District of Cali-
fornia, to Mayor Evans of Davis, California, (Sept. 16, 1986), regarding the Davis "City
Sanctuary" resolution, contains the statement: "Courts have, furthermore, recognized
that the question of asylum is a political question and is essentially a matter of foreign
policy." This statement is in direct contradiction to the plain wording of the 1980 Refu-
gee Act.
In keeping with this unwritten policy, no positive State Department recommenda-
tion has ever been received in a Salvadoran or Guatemalan case since the inception of
the Central American Refugee Project of Denver in 1982. Additionally, not one of the
negative State Department recommendations was overruled by the local Immigration
Judge. Interview with Cheryl Martinez, Director of the Denver Central American Refu-
gee Project, Denver, Colorado (Feb. 12, 1987).
59. An unfavorable decision is appealable to the Board of Immigration Appeals.
From there, an appeal is made in a U.S. District Court or a Federal Court of Appeals
depending on the reason for appeal. Eventual judicial review of a Board decision by the
U.S. Supreme Court is possible. T. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN, supra note 46, at 643.
60. In denying the relief sought by a political asylum applicant whose application had
been denied by an INS District Director for failure to exhaust administrative remedies,
the Seventh Circuit noted that the decision made by the District Director "involves con-
siderations of foreign and domestic policy and administrative efficiency and is clearly
committed to the political branches of the government." Kashani v. INS, 793 F.2d 818,
828 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 644 (1986). The status of this rather peculiar
decision is uncertain given the decision in the Cardoza-Fonseca case.
61. For an extensive discussion of the current misapplication of international refugee
law by the United States in favor of ideologic categories, see Sautman, The Meaning of
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This ideological interpretation of the definition of refugee
has lead to a bifurcated approach in determining refugee status.
The standard applied to a person who is fleeing a communist
country arguably is broader than the fundamental rights ap-
proach . 2 On the other hand, the United States has narrowly in-
terpreted its obligations under the 1967 Protocol regarding ap-
plicants from non-communist countries to the point of
legitimizing a nonsensical interpretation of its obligation.6
There are no indications that the United States is interna-
tionalizing its domestic refugee policy or practice. United States
law fails to provide any role for the United Nations High Com-
missioner for Refugees (UNHCR)6 4 Refugee law and procedure
is still tied to immigration law and its institutions. 5
"Well-Founded Fear of Persecution" in United States Asylum Law and in Interna-
tional Law, 9 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 483 (1986); see also Seidenberg, Withholding of Depor-
tation: Burdening the Refugee in Contravention of International Standards, 11 BROOK-
LYN J. INT'L L. 379 (1985).
62. E.g., Suhrke, supra notes 11 and 45. The communist/non-communist country di-
chotomy applies in about 80% of the cases. For a well-documented study of the different
standards applied by country of origin, see Koehn, Persistent Problems and Political
Issues in U.S. Immigration Law and Policy, 15 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y (to be published
in the 1987 issue).
63. The standard applied prior to the Cardoza-Fonseca decision was "a clear
probability of persecution," which the Court has held is incongruent with the intent of
the 1980 Refugee Act and the U.S. obligation under the 1967 Protocol. The Court has
ordered the INS to apply the "well founded fear of persecution" standard. INS v. Car-
doza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. at 1222.
Under the clear probability of persecution standard, an applicant had to prove that
he or she would be singled out for persecution in his or her home country. This standard
defeated the purpose of the 1967 Protocol, for the Protocol and Convention define a
refugee as anyone who has a well-founded fear on the basis of race or one of the other
enumerated categories. The U.S. has legitimized its refugee law by applying the 1967
Protocol inappropriately. For example, according to the old U.S. application of the inter-
national standard, a black South African applying for asylum must prove how he or she
is singled out for persecution. Given that all black South Africans suffer political perse-
cution at the hands of the illegal apartheid system, it would be difficult to prove the
applicant is singled out for persecution, but nonetheless he or she certainly is a victim of
political persecution within the 1967 Protocol. See Note, Political Legitimacy in the Law
of Political Asylum, 99 HARV. L. REv. 450 (1985).
In response to a telephone inquiry to the local INS office in Denver, Colorado on
September 22, 1986, to inquire as to the number of South Africans who had applied for
political asylum in the last few years, the officer laughed and asked, "South Africa, what
grounds would they have for asylum?"
64. Goodwin-Gill, The Obligation of States and the Protection Function of the Of-
fice of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 1982 MICH. Y.B. INT'L LE-
GAL STUD. 291, 316 (1982).
65. Avery, Refugee Status Decision-Making: The Systems of Ten Countries, 19
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Although many scholars see a clear inconsistency between
the obligations of the United States and its application of refu-
gee law, 6 the United States courts are just beginning to see the
inconsistency.17 The bifurcated application of refugee law to the
four major methods of relief in the United States highlights how
susceptible to manipulation the current body of international
refugee law is when the sovereign applies the definition of a ref-
ugee. While the Supreme Court has demonstrated movement to-
ward the application of a more objective definition of a refugee,
continued progress will be limited by the grounding of the refu-
gee definition in sovereign privilege. Given the newness of the
recent Supreme Court decision in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, it is
impossible to speculate accurately about the extent to which
United States refugee law and policy will move toward the fun-
damental rights approach. Currently there seems to be little, if
any, movement in that direction.
On the other hand, the United States has recognized the
connection between its foreign policy activities and refugee
flow.68 Currently, however, the limited conception of a refugee
STAN. J. INT'L L. 235, 343 (1983).
66. The United States supported establishing a mandatory obligation of nonrefoule-
ment during the Convention on Territorial Asylum. See Weis, The Draft United Na-
tions Convention on Territorial Asylum, 50 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 151, 167 (1979). "In light
of what the United States has said and done in international meetings, we [the U.S.] are
now in a very inconsistent position." Proceedings: Conference on International Human
Rights Law in State and Federal Courts, 17 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 52 (1982) (comments of
Mike Posner: The Haitian Cases and the Detention of Immigrants).
Senator Simpson, co-author of the 1986 amendments to the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act, would disagree: "One thing is absolutely clear. We must be selective. We
cannot admit everyone who wants to enter the United States, even everyone in desperate
condition . . . . When the issue of selectivity is raised in this arena, it has always been
zeroed in on as being a racist policy or a prejudicial policy. That is not what it is ... "
Quoted in Nanda, supra note 6, at 473.
67. In the Stevic case, the Supreme Court recognized that Congress intended the
Refugee Act to bring United States asylum practices into harmony with the nation's
obligations under the U.N. Protocol, and it stated there were no conflicts between the
two. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984).
The Supreme Court recently has changed its mind concerning U.S. practices and its
obligation under the 1967 Protocol. Currently, those practices are mandated to change.
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. 1207.
68. The extent of the connection seems to vary from administration to administra-
tion. See Warren, Refugees, A Global Issue, Dep't of State Bull. 53 (Sept. 1980);
Schoultz, U.S. Policy Toward Human Rights in Latin America: A Comparative Analysis
of Two Administrations, 8 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 591 (1979); Nanda, Human Rights
and U.S. Foreign Policy Under Carter: Continuity and Change, 8 DEN. J. INT'L L. &
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(one fleeing communism) serves to distort United States policies
aimed at refugee flow. Former Secretary of State Alexander Haig
used refugee outflow to justify United States policies of inter-
vention in Central America. 9 President Reagan has answered
critics of that same intervention with the warning that: "a string
of anti-American Marxist dictatorships [in Central America will
result in] a tidal wave of refugees seeking safe haven from Com-
munist repression.
'70
While the minimization of refugee flow is an important for-
eign policy objective,7 1 the overly constrained definition of a ref-
ugee the United States applies will defeat the realization of this
goal. Bombing a village in El Salvador or supporting contra at-
tacks in Nicaragua leave communities unable to provide for their
basic needs, thus stimulating refugee flows. Every day armed
military action is carried on in Central America with the assis-
tance of the United States government in order to prevent a
"string of marxist takeovers. '7 2 Current United States foreign
policy may in fact have more to do with the creation of refugee
flows, than averting them. Redefining who is a refugee, as the
United States has done with regard to those who have fled the
effects of United States foreign policy in Central America, does
not curtail the existence of refugees and in fact obfuscates the




69. Haig expressed the concern that the U.S. would be flooded with refugees if the
radicalization of the hemisphere continued, therefore, U.S. intervention was needed to
avoid the flood of refugees. Haig Fears Exiles From Latin Areas May Flood the U.S.,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1982, at Al, col. 6, quoted in Teitelbaum, Immigration, Refugees,
and Foreign Policy, 38 INT'L ORG. 429, 434 (1984).
70X Addressing the Central American question, President Reagan said that "to dis-
arm our friends" would produce a string of Marxist dictatorships. He continued: "the
result could be a tidal wave of refugees-and this time they'll be 'feet people' not 'boat
people'-swarming into our country seeking a safe haven from Communist repression to
our south." Reagan Says His Opponents Risk Central American Influx, N.Y. Times,
June 21, 1983, at A14, col. 1, quoted in Teitelbaum, id. at 435.
71. Immigration also can be an extension of foreign policy, as it is in the United
States. Leibowitz, Comparative Analysis of Immigration in Key Developed Countries in
Relation to Immigration Reform and Control Legislation in the United States, 7 HuM.
RTS. L.J. 1 (1986).
72. See Schoultz, supra note 68, at 592-93 (lists many scholarly works discussing U.S.
support for repressive governments).
73. In contrast, U.S. food and development aid have been changed repeatedly, Wal-
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Canada
The Canadian system of law dealing with refugees has been
developing for many years and is well respected in the world
community. 74 Canada even boasts about its humanitarian tradi-
tion in its refugee law.75 Canada is a party to the 1951 Conven-
tion and the 1967 Protocol on Refugees,7" which have been in-
corporated into Canadian law."
Canadian refugee law can be divided into two categories:
discretionary and non-discretionary relief. Discretionary relief
includes a refugee resettlement program which utilizes a broader
definition of refugee than the Convention. This program admits
victims of natural disasters, civil wars, and other dire circum-
stances .7  Until recently the Canadian government-automatically
granted admission to any person seeking refuge from a list of 18
countries. 79  Non-discretionary relief includes the right to
czak, New Directions in U.S. Food Aid: Human Rights and Economic Development, 8
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 543 (1979), and have been subjected to a great deal of criticism,
e.g., Sheperd, The Tributary State and "People's Rights" in Africa: The Banjul Charter
and Self-Reliance, 32 AFRICA TODAY, 37 (1985), and H. MAGDOFF, THE AGE OF IMPERIAL-
ISM-THE ECONOMICS OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (1969).
74. See Gilbert, supra note 19, at 644.
75. Regulations Respecting the Designation of a Political Prisoner and Oppressed
Persons Designated Class, in THE ANNOTATED IMMIGRATION ACT OF CANADA 212, § 3 (F.
Marrocco & H. Goslett 1984).
76. Canada, like most common law derived systems, must enact federal legislation to
give effect to its treaties. See Transnational Legal Problems of Refugees, Appendix III,
Review of Foreign Laws, 1982 MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD., 553, 560 [hereinafter For-
eign Laws Appendix].
77. See Cox, "Well Founded Fear of Being Persecuted": The Sources and Applica-
tion of A Criterion of Refugee Status, 10 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 333, 363 nn. 219-20 (1984)
(citing Immigration Act, 1976, ch. 52, § 2(1), 1976-77 Can. Stat. 1193; GOVERNMENT OF
CANADA, OFFICE OF THE MINISTER OF EMPLOYMENT AND IMMIGRATION, IMMIGRATION MAN-
UAL § 3.07(1)(a) (1982)).
78. Wydrzynski, Refugees and the Immigration Act, 25 McGILL L.J. 154, 166 (1979).
For those fleeing undesirable circumstances, discretionary relief is usually granted by
country. For example, execution of removal orders has been suspended for El
Salvadorans. Cox, supra note 77, at 336 (citing GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, OFFICE OF THE
MINISTER OF EMPLOYMENT AND IMMIGRATION, IMMIGRATION MANUAL §§ 26(2), 26(7)).
79. Between May 21, 1986 and February 23, 1987, a person from any one of the 18
countries was free to enter Canada and remain in Canada for one year, during which
time the person could apply for political asylum. Because of the Canadian government's
policy not to deport rejected applicants to areas involved in civil disturbances, the policy
allowed anyone from the 18 countries to enter and remain in Canada. The list of coun-
tries included El Salvador, Guatemala, and Iran. After February 23, 1987, people from
those countries must go through the regular channels to enter and remain in Canada.
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nonrefoulement ° and asylum for those either already in Canada
or those in a foreign country who can prove their eligibility ac-
cording to the Convention definition."1
In determining a non-discretionary claim, the Minister of
Employment & Immigration (MEI) refers the claim and the
transcript of the applicant's interview to the Refugee Status Ad-
visory Committee (RSAC) for consideration. 2 The RSAC's deci-
sion is usually accepted by the Minister. 3 Two areas of this pro-
cess merit further discussion: 1) the burden of proof or standard
used by the RSAC; and 2) the composition of RSAC and the
sources of information upon which it relies.
The RSAC standard liberalizes the character of the Conven-
tion definition, and a deprivation of fundamental rights is con-
sidered, to an extent, a basis for a legitimate claim of refugee
status."'
Telephone interview with Steve Holly, Immigration Department of the Canadian Consu-
late of San Fransico (March 11, 1987).
80. Wydrzynski, supra note 78, at 157.
81. "Convention Refugee" means any person who, by reason of a well-founded
fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group or political opinion, (a) is outside the country of his na-
tionality and is unable or, by reasons of such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of
the protection of that country, or (b) not having a country of his nationality, is
outside the country of his former habitual residence and is unable or by reason
of such fear, is unwilling to return to that country.
Immigration Act, 1976, ch. 52, §2(1), 1976-77 Can. Stat. 1193, reprinted in 2(8) Canada
Gazette, Pt. III.
82. Avery, supra note 65, at 259-60.
83. Immigration Act, supra note 81, at § 45(4).
84. [T]he claimant will receive the benefit of the doubt; even with no evidence of
past persecution, an individual may be a refugee if reasonable grounds exist to
fear persecution in the future; persecution may take forms other than interfer-
ence with personal freedom, including arbitrary interference with a person's
family, home correspondence, job, or education; persecution may be periodic;
persecution may take the form of indiscriminate terror; immigration considera-
tions, such as the government's fear that if one person is granted refugee status
many others similarly situated might claim refugee status, are irrelevant to the
assessment of a claim; highly visible political activity is not a prerequisite for
status as a political refugee; a well-founded fear of persecution need not have
arisen before the claimant left his country; and a person may be a refugee even if
he was able to leave his country without difficulty.
Avery, supra note 65, at 266 (1983) (citing New Refugee Status Advisory Guidelines on
Refugee Definition and Assessment of Credibility (Feb. 20, 1982), reprinted in REFUGE:
CANADA'S NEwSL. ON REFUGEES, Mar.-Apr. 1982, at 5-6).
Canada is more likely to consider generalized conditions in the home country, and
the effect of those conditions on the refugee's well-being, in considering an application.
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While the refugee decision-making process is not completely
removed from immigration decisions, 85 RSAC, with the majority
of the decision-making power, is a semi-autonomous body de-
voted to refugee issues.8 6 In addition, a UNHCR representative
serves as an observer and an adviser who is able to provide
RSAC members with a balanced collection of human rights in-
formation.8 7 The RSAC is conscious of the possibility of undue
influence by the Department of External Affairs,88 and, there-
fore, it seeks out a variety of sources upon which to base a
decision. 9
If a negative determination from RSAC is affirmed by the
Minister, it is appealable to the Immigration Appeals Board
(IAB).9 The board reviews the application to determine whether
it falls within the Immigration Act.9 The board may also deter-
mine whether any humanitarian grounds exist to allow the ap-
plicant to remain in Canada, even though the applicant is not
within the provisions of the Act.92 The procedure for non-Con-
vention refugees (e.g., victims of natural disasters, civil wars,
and other dire circumstances that do not fit into the liberal in-
terpretation of the Convention) is determined in a discretionary
fashion by the Cabinet and the ministry of employment and
immigration. 3
The most important recent development in Canadian refu-
gee law is congruent with the internationalization of Canada's
definition of a refugee and its procedures for dealing with refu-
gees. Canada is moving toward grounding its refugee law in
human rights law, as opposed to international refugee law. A re-
Delli Sante, supra note 39.
85. The initial interview is made by an Immigration official, who ordinarily is not
trained in refugee matters. Howard, Contemporary Canadian Refugee Policy: A Critical
Assessment, 6 CAN. PuB. POL'y 366 (1980); but see Avery, supra note 65, at 259-60
(describing a new program conducted by RSAC and the UNHCR designed to train these
officials).
86. For a complete discussion of the composition of RSAC, see Avery, supra note 65,
at 260-66.
87. Id. at 260, 273.
88. Id. at 261.
89. Sexton, supra note 1, at 764.
90. Cox, supra note 77, at 364.
91. Foreign Laws Appendix, supra note 76, at 561.
92. Wydrzynski, supra note 78, at 165; see also Avery, supra note 65, at 271.
93. Foreign Laws Appendix, supra note 76, at 562.
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cent Canadian case 94 held that article 7 of the Charter of Rights
and Freedoms applied to all individuals who were within the
boundaries of Canada, regardless of residency status. 5 As one
commentator observed, refugee status decisions are "inherently
political and value-laden,"96 but, by grounding the decision in
human rights law, the value judgment has been made and the ad
hoc political decision is no longer necessary.
Thus, Canada is moving toward a fundamental rights ap-
proach grounded in human rights law. 7 To an extent, its proce-
dures are also being internationalized. Inherent in the decision-
making procedure seems to be an understanding that refugee
flows are created by factors other than simply the flee from com-
munism. 8 To an extent, the disbursement of foreign aid is
linked with human rights.99 Morevever, other factors indicate
94. Singh v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, 1 S.C.R. 177 (1985). Even
though the UNHCR had previously approved the Canadian refugee program, the court
found the program inadequate to meet its obligations under human rights law.
95. Article 7 reads: "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person
and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accord with the principles of funda-
mental justice." This principle can be considered an embodiment of Canada's obligations
under the 1967 U.N. Human Rights Covenants. See Hayward, International Law and
the Interpretation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: Uses and Justifi-
cations, 23 U. W. ONTARIO L. REV. 9 (1985).
96. Wydrzynski, Immigration Law-Determination of Refugee Status-Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, 64 CAN. BAR REV. 172, 174 (1986).
97. There is some controversy concerning the direction in which Canada is headed.
One faction sees a need to place further restrictions on all forms of immigration, along
with a stricter application of the law, and it makes no distinction between refugees and
immigrants. Berger, Principles and Procedures of Immigration to Canada, 1985 INT'L
LEG. PRAcT. 120, 127 (1985). The second faction complains that the current changes are
not happening fast enough and more needs to be done. According to the second faction,
the intimate connection between the Minister of Employment and Immigration and the
Foreign Ministry should be severed, and the treatment of applicants by the Commission
should better reflect refugees' needs. E.g., Avery, supra note 65, at 259-61. The recent
modification of open entry procedure does not affect Canadian refugee law, and it may
even have a liberalizing effect on out-of-country asylum applications. While deprivation
of fundamental rights of all residents from 18 countries is possible, the Canadian pro-
gram is discretionary. A clearer trend toward the fundamental rights approach is evi-
denced by the recent court decision giving all people in Canada rights, regardless of their
residency status. Singh v. Minister of Employment Immigration, 1 S.C.R. 177 (1985).
98. Even the new conservative government is unwilling to see the world in terms of
an east-west, good-evil dichotomy. Bromke & Nossal, Canada: Foreign Policy Outlook
After the Conservative Victory, 40 THE WORLD TODAY 462 (1984).
99. A country that practices gross and systematic human rights abuses receives no
aid from Canada. Nolan, The Influence of Parliament on Human Rights in Canadian
Foreign Policy, 7 HUM. RTS. Q. 373 (1985).
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that Canadian developmental aid is no longer trade based, but
rather that the aid programs are directed at improving the fun-
damental rights situation.100 Canadian policies, both refugee and
foreign, are beginning to reflect the fundamental rights ap-
proach, thereby exhibiting an understanding of the dual nature
of the contemporary refugee problem and have taken steps to-
ward effectively dealing with it.
Australia
Australia has shown great compassion by accepting on a per
capita basis more refugees than any other country. 0 1 Australia is
also a party to both the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol. 102
Of the three ways to gain refuge in Australia, the most fre-
quently used avenue is the regular immigration procedure. 03
Only a fraction of the total refugee applicants are Convention
refugees, who either apply for asylum if they are in Australia or
apply from overseas.'
04
Prior to 1980, no statutory basis for refugee determinations
existed in Australia.'05 In 1985, the Australian High Court held
that the Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs has au-
thority to grant refugee status under a 1980 amendment to the
100. Debate concerning the mutual exclusivity of the two is unimportant for this dis-
cussion, because the focus of Canada's program is what has changed. See THE NORTH-
SOUTH INST., NORTH-SOUTH ENCOUNTER: THE THIRD WORLD AND CANADIAN PERFORMANCE
(1977).
101. E.g., North, Down Under Amnesties: Background, Programs and Comparative
Insights, 18 INT'L MIG. REV. 524 (1984).
102. See Transnational Legal Problems of Refugees, Appendix I, International In-
struments 1982 MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD., 495, 515, 521, app. I [hereinafter Interna-
tional Instruments Appendix]. Although "these instruments have not been enacted by
the Australian Parliament and therefore do not carry the force of law internally," For-
eign Laws Appendix, supra note 76, at 553, the Committee that decides refugee status in
Australia applies the definitions from those documents. Goodwin-Gill, supra note 64, at
308.
103. Foreign Laws Appendix, supra note 76, at 553. Besides normal immigration,
refugees may obtain legal status through asylum from the Committee for the Determina-
tion of Refugee Status, or protection from extradition for "crimes" that may be associ-
ated with their status as refugees. Id. at 553-54.
104. Goodwin-Gill, supra note 64, at 307.
105. Amendment s.6A(1)(c) to the Migration Act 1958, AUsTL. ACTS P. No. 62 (1958),
basically incorporated the Convention standard; see also Lancy, Minister for Immigra-
tion and Ethnic Affairs v. Mayer, 15 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 536, 537 (1986).
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Immigration Act."0 6
Currently, all refugee applications are forwarded by the
Minister of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs to the Standing In-
terdepartmental Committee on Refugees for the Determination
of Refugee Status (DORS) Committee. The DORS committee
makes a recommendation to the Minster, who invariably follows
it.'0 7 The DORS Committee is composed of representatives from
many different governmental agencies and a non-voting repre-
sentative from UNHCR, who provides balanced and extensive
information to the Committee.'0 8
The standard applied in Australia to define a refugee seems
to follow closely the Convention definition. 0 9 No appeal is avail-
able from the denial of an overseas application," 0 nor is appeal
available if the DORS Committee or the Minister denies an asy-
lum application from an applicant who is in the country. The
only formal provision for reconsideration allows the Minister to
refer a case back to the DORS Committee if new information
becomes available."'
Although an asylum seeker is in a precarious position in
Australia, the rights afforded a refugee are increasing."' For ex-
106. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v. Mayer, 61 A.L.R. 609, 618 (1985).
107. Goodwin-Gill, supra note 64, at 307.
108. Many sources of information are used to prevent bias. See Avery, supra note 65,
at 246-47.
109. According to the UNHCR representative in Australia, the standard has been
applied in an equitable and not overly restrictive fashion where no bias in favor of or
against certain nationalities is present. Id. at 249.
110. Goodwin-Gill, supra note 64, at 307. Australian law does not prohibit summary
expulsion of refugee applicants by border authorities, but the general practice allows the
applicant to remain until her claim is processed. Avery, supra note 65, at 245. The 1980
Immigration (Unauthorized Arrivals) Act, AUSTL. ACTS P. No. 112 (1980), passed in re-
sponse to the influx of boat people, imposes substantial penalties on persons who bring
to Australia large numbers of prohibited immigrants. Foreign Laws Appendix, supra
note 76, at 553.
111. In certain limited circumstances it may be possible to appeal under the Admin-
istrative Appeals Tribunal Act of 1975 and/or the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Re-
view) Act. Goodwin-Gill, supra note 64, at 308-09. One final appeal possibility exists for
those challenging error in administrative procedure, in which the applicant may request
that the Ombudsman or administrative "watchdog" review the procedure. Avery, supra
note 65, at 248.
112. Lancy, supra note 105, at 538. A distinction is drawn between an asylum seeker,
one who is using the procedures for asylum, and a refugee, one who has been deprived of
fundamental rights. While relief is improving for a refugee in Australia, that relief does
not necessarily come from the asylum procedure.
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ample, under the 1985 High Court decision, a written justifica-
tion must accompany the denial of an applicant's refugee
status.'13
The membership of the UNHCR representative on the
DORS committee illustrates the internationalization of Austra-
lia's refugee determination process. Some suggested changes in-
dicate further internationalization, such as a revision of the for-
mat for the initial interview and a suggested provision of a
voting right for the UNHCR representative on the DORS
Committee.""
The fact that Australia has not broadened significantly the
Convention definition of a refugee does not negate the inference
that it has moved toward an adoption of a fundamental rights
approach. It must be remembered that asylum is only a small
part of an entire refugee program. Standard immigration proce-
dures, using criteria broader than the fundamental rights ap-
proach, are used by the bulk of refugees. There is, however, little
movement to redefine the bounds of each separate program.
Australia recognizes a connection between foreign policy, in-
dividuals meeting their basic needs, and refugee flows. Migration
from underdevelopment and conflict is not, to Australia, a viable
long-run alternative to a global solution to the problem of refu-
gees. Thus, Australia uses its foreign policy as a mechanism to
stem problems that contribute to refugee flows." 5 Australia's
foreign aid policy embodies a combination of motives: humanita-
rian, strategic, and economic. The foremost objective, however,
is the accommodation of global concerns." 6 In Australia, a global
awareness is growing, for not only domestically is Australia's ref-
ugee policy moving toward the fundamental rights approach, but
Australian foreign policy is beginning to stress fundamental
rights in order to avert potential refugee flows.'
113. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v. Mayer, 61 A.L.R. 609 (1985).
114. Avery, supra note 65, at 249-50.
115. Australia's heavy concentration of economic and development aid in the Asian-
Pacific makes sense not only in terms of defense, but as a preventive refugee measure.
Jackson, Australia's Foreign Aid, 39 AUSTRALIAN OUTLOOK 13 (1985).
116. Id.
117. Stent, The Jackson Report: A Critical Review, 39 AUSTRALIAN OUTLOOK 33
(1985).
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United Kingdom
The United Kingdom's homogenous history is evidence that
it has never been a country of immigrants. Today, although the
population profile of the country is shifting as a result of the
influx of refugees and immigrants from developing nations, the
net migration is negative. 18 Moreover, the United Kingdom's
immigration policies have been severely criticized as sexist, ra-
cist and blatantly unfair."19 Against this backdrop of criticism
the government juxtaposes a British tradition of taking in those
fleeing persecution, and thus is attempting to create a more gen-
erous refugee policy within a strict immigration policy.'
The United Kingdom is also a party to the 1951 Convention
and the 1967 Protocol.' 2' It is difficult to delineate the United
Kingdom's refugee policy because no law directly relates to refu-
gees.' 22 Rather, the "law" is formed from the rules, regulations,
and procedures of the Home Office (the immigration author-
ity). 23 Basically, an individual can gain refuge in the United
Kingdom by one of three avenues: 1) as an overseas refugee; 24
2) under the Convention definition in an application for asy-
lum; 2 ' or 3) pursuant to an application for an "exceptional leave
118. COMMISSION FOR RACIAL EQUALITY, IMMIGRATION CONTROL AND PROCEDURES: RE-
PORT OF A FORMAL INVESTIGATION 134 (1985) [hereinafter Racial Equality].
119. E.g., Immigration Out of Step With Public, The Guardian (Manchester, Eng-
land), May 9, 1984; Immigration Report Reveals Raw Deal for Blacks, The Guardian
(Manchester, England), Feb. 13, 1985; Britain Set Poser by Entry Ruling, The Guardian
(Manchester, England), May 29, 1985, at 1, col. 1 (article discusses how Britain was rep-
rimanded by the European Court of Human Rights because its immigration laws are
discriminatory).
120. HOME AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, FIRST REPORT, (hereinafter HOME AFFAIRS).
121. International Instruments Appendix, supra note 102, at 515, 521.
122. Avery, supra note 65, at 326.
123. L. GRANT & I. MARTIN, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PRACTICE 323 (1982).
124. The six countries accepting the highest numbers of Vietnamese "boat people,"
in rank order according to the number accepted, were the U.S., Canada, France, Austra-
lia, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the U.K. HOME AFFAIRS, supra note 120, at
Vii.
125. Before 1984 there was a difference between asylum with refugee status and asy-
lum without refugee status. Id. See also L. GRANT & I. MARTIN, supra note 123, at 333.
The standard applied is:
A person may apply for asylum in the United Kingdom on the ground that, if he
were required to leave, he would have to go to a country to which he is unwilling
to go owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. Any
such claim is to be carefully considered in the light of all the relevant
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to remain," which may be granted both by country and upon
individual application. 26 This third basis for refugee protection
applies to all those who have a general fear of returning to a
country that is in a state of disruption, where disorder is wide-
spread, severe, and of long duration.
27
Once an application for refugee status has been made, the
Home Office evaluates the application and interviews the appli-
cant to determine if the applicant is due any relief. The decision
of the Home Office is made by the Refugee Unit.'28 Many schol-
ars and practitioners believe that the Home Office relies too
heavily upon information provided by the Foreign Office, thus
skewing decisions to reflect current foreign policy. It has been
suggested that a UNHCR representative should play a decision-
making role and that information from a UNHCR representa-
tive should be used to balance the information of the Home Of-
fice. 2 No such role is currently played by the UNHCR. 30
Areas of ambiguity arise from the disparate treatment a ref-
ugee receives on the basis of her location-within the United
Kingdom, or at the border; her documentation-with visa, or
without visa; and her choice of application forum and proce-
dure-applying affirmatively or in a deportation proceeding.
"
circumstances.
In accordance with the provisions of the Convention and Protocol relating
to the Status of Refugees, a deportation order will not be made against a person
if the only country to which he can be removed is one to which he is unwilling to
go owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.
Paras. 134, and 165 of the Immigration Rules (1972).
126. Under the country rubric as of 1984 the countries included Afghanistan, Iran,
Lebanon, Poland, Uganda, and El Salvador. HOME AFFAIRS, supra note 120, at xlv.
127. The basis of Exceptional Leave to Remain allows the person to remain in the
U.K. until it is secure to return to her home country. There have been some complaints
that this method of relief has been politically influenced; for example, Sri Lankan Tamils
in 1984 were not granted exceptional leave to remain. Instead, only a moratorium on
their removal was established. Id. at xlvi.
128. L. GRANT & I. MARTIN, supra note 123, at 328.
129. Avery, supra note 65, at 323.
130. Id. at 323, 325.
131. The applications of those refugees standing at the border were previously
screened by immigration officers. Complaints of unfair screening have led to the develop-
ment of a new process, and all asylum requests are now granted an interview. The immi-
gration officer then forwards a transcript of the interview to the Immigration and Na-
tionality Department's Home Office.
Refugee applicants already present in the U.K. are interviewed by an official from
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These distinctions are important both in processing a refugee's
application and in the possibility of an appeal. ' Realistically,
an appeal of a denial is possible only for those who have visas,
because those who do not have visas can appeal only after they
have left the United Kingdom. 3'
The definition of refugee used in the United Kingdom can
at times be much broader than the Convention definition of a
refugee, but it stops short of the fundamental rights approach
definition of a refugee."' Neither the criteria for asylum nor the
exceptions allowing a refugee to remain in the United Kingdom
are set out clearly in the law.135 Thus, it is argued that many
refugee decisions are politically influenced. 36 In fact, the United
Kingdom might be seen as having a bifurcated approach to refu-
gees, similar to that of the United States, except that in the
United Kingdom, the decisional biases are related to both past
colonial practices and ideology.1
37
Important recent developments have occurred in cases
brought before the European Court of Human Rights where po-
tential refugees argued that their rights were violated by the
United Kingdom's laws and procedures. The cases point out the
United Kingdom's obligations under the Covenant on Civil and
the Immigration and Nationality Department, who usually has some knowledge of asy-
lum and of refugees. The transcript of the interview is then forwarded to the Home
Office. See L. GRANT & I. MARTIN, supra note 123, at 327.
132. Many complaints regarding denial of valid claims at the border resulted in inap-
propriate expulsions. For a discussion of the 1980 change in the immigration rules
designed to discontinue this practice, see Sexton, supra note 1, at 747.
133. Generally, all appeals are heard first by the immigration appeals adjudicators.
From there, appeal is available to the Immigration Appeal Tribunal. Judicial review is
then possible by way of certiorari. Mandamus first judicial appeal goes to the Divisional
Court, then to the High Court, and then, by leave, to the Court of Appeals and the
House of Lords. See L. GRANT & I. MARTIN, supra note 123, at 330; Avery, supra note 65,
at 323.
134. In the U.S., refugee applicants from El Salvador are almost always rejected as
not fitting into the Convention definition. According to a study conducted in the U.K.,
there were 42 applicants from El Salvador from 1980-82. Of the 32 applications actually
processed, 3 were withdrawn, 12 applicants were granted refugee status, 11 applicants
were granted asylum, and 6 applications were rejected (the system of classification has
since changed). The study did not indicate whether the 6 rejected applicants applied for
exception to remain. Cox, supra note 77, at 363.
135. Avery, supra note 65, at 326.
136. E.g., Racial Equality, supra note 118, at 127, 128.
137. Kreisberg, The Political Nature of Refugee Recognition in the United Kingdom
(unpublished manuscript); see also Racial Equality, supra note 118.
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Political Rights and the European Convention on Human
Rights, and have been successful in helping to expand refugee
rights."3 8 This development illustrates a gradual shift in the
grounding of the United Kingdom's refugee law from interna-
tional refugee law to human rights law.
Whether the United Kingdom recognizes or acts upon the
connection between foreign policy and refugee flow is unclear.
For the most part, developmental aid is given to former colonies
and members of the commonwealth, with the goal of facilitating
trade. 39 Rhetorically, the Labour party has been concerned with
international welfare, while the Conservative party would like to
use aid for each country's "maximum mutual advantage." In re-
ality neither party's foreign policy program has had the assur-
ance of fundamental rights as an important goal. 14 0
Overall, the United Kingdom, like the United States, uses
Convention refugee law to legitimize its current unjust practices.
The major difference between the two countries is that the
United Kingdom's practices are now under challenge in the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights. This development, when com-
bined with public opinion in favor of liberalizing immigration
and refugee policies, will move the United Kingdom gradually
toward the fundamental rights approach. Presently, however,
the United Kingdom is far from the realization that foreign pol-
icy must be conscious of the causes of refugee flows and take
steps to avert them.
138. In one case a Moroccan army officer sought asylum in the U.K., but was turned
away at the border. Upon his return to Morocco, he was killed. The officer's wife brought
suit in the European Court of Human Rights. No decision was made because the U.K.
settled with the claimant. See United Kingdom Immigrants Advisory Service, Annual
Report 11 (1982-3); see also Runnymede Trust, Runnymede Report on Immigration in
the United Kingdom (1985) (detailed study of the application of human rights law to
expand refugee rights in the U.K.); Curtis, The Impact of the Treaty of Rome Upon
Certain Aspects of the United Kingdom's Immigration Law, 18 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
443 (1986).
139. EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT POLICIES (B. Dinwiddy 1973).
140. Cunliffe, British Economic Aid Policy and International Human Rights: A
Comparative Analysis of Conservative and Labour Policies in the 1970's, 33 POL. STUD.
101 (1985).
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France
The current public debate on refugees in France is created
by a set of circumstances almost completely opposite to those
that have created the debate on refugees in the United King-
dom.' While France is not a country of immigrants, it has a
long tradition of generously granting asylum. 42 Even the French
Constitution contains references to asylum. 143 France is a party
to the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol, and both docu-
ments are binding as law in France. Given the fact that French
practices were already more generous than the minimum set out
in the Convention,"" their adoption was basically a formality.
Although conditions in France have changed greatly in the
last 30 years, neither significant change in refugee law nor much
debate about refugees occurred until 1986.15 During the last 30
years, the changes wrought by post-colonialism and the arrival
of foreign guest workers created a significant foreign-born popu-
lation within France." 6 No major issues grew out of these politi-
cal and demographic changes until the recent economic down-
turn, when, according to commentators, foreigners were viewed
as scapegoats."1 7 France's lax immigration practices and gener-
141. Both grow out of the lack of a clear distinction drawn between refugees and
immigrants; however, the traditions are completely different, a are the current direc-
tions of reform (or lack thereof).
142. Avery, supra note 65, at 295.
143. For example, the preamble to the 1946 and 1958 French Constitutions read:
"Anyone persecuted because of his activities in the cause of freedom has the right to
asylum within the territories of the Republic." See Foreign Laws Appendix, supra note
76, at 564-66.
144. See F. JACOMET, F. TIBERGHIGN, Preface to La Protection des Refugies en France
21 (1984) (requirements for persecution because of factors such as political, religious,
racial, national origin and membership in a social group; discusses ways in which the
French definition is more generous than the Convention).
145. See, e.g., Une Trentaine d'Associations Jugent Extremement Dangereux-le
Project de Loi sur les Etrangers, Le Monde (Paris) June 20, 1986. For an account of the
lack of change in the law, see R. Salomon, Les Refugies, in Que Status Je? (1963), for
support of the contention from the liberal tradition, and to show practices have not
changed much in the past 30 years. Compare Aleinikoff, supra note 41, at 215.
146. See, e.g., Safran, The Mitterand Regime and Its Policies of Ethnocultural Ac-
commodation, 18 CoMP. POL. 41 (1985).
147. Despite increased terrorist activities in France, President Mitterand has voiced
his opinion that France will not react against refugees, that France was able to distin-
guish immigrants from refugees, and would not fall prey to xenophobia. Amnesty Inter-
national reports that, unfortunately, there is growing xenophobia among the French, due
mainly to the sluggish economy. The differentiation cited by the President is disappear-
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ous political asylum then became the focus of public debate." 8
Some claim the presence of foreigners exacerbates unemploy-
ment in France, while others protest the proposals for constrict-
ing immigration practices as racist and xenophobic. 49 The de-
bate thus far has resulted only in the passage of a minor
amendment to a 1945 law, and is intended to make false applica-
tions less likely to succeed."'0
Currently, three basic ways exist to attain refuge or to re-
main in France: 1) through the resettlement program; 2) through
an application for asylum or refugee status; and 3) through de
facto nonrefoulement. The main criterion for entry under the
refugee resettlement program is family reunification. Hence, it is
not directly related to the Convention definition of a refugee.1 5
An individual may apply for asylum or refugee status at the
border or within France, either by an affirmative filing or
through a deportation proceeding.1 52 An applicant must show
that she has a fear of persecution and that the fear is reasonable.
The decision whether a reasonable fear exists is not based upon
the likelihood of persecution, but on a plausible account of
fear. 153
ing, and non-Convention refugees who have decided to remain in France are being
treated as second class citizens. See Droit d'asile attention fragile, Chronique (Amnesty
International Section Francaise, Feb. 1986) at 1; letter from Iona Bocikis, Amnesty In-
ternational member, Toulouse, France (Feb. 21, 1986) (discussing refugee situation in
France).
148. E.g., Sole l'Entree et le Sejour des Etrangers-Un Projet Rabote, Le Monde
(Paris), July 8, 1986.
149. E.g., Le Debat sur l'mmigration, Le Monde (Paris), July 10, 1986.
150. The change in the law itself is not major, and does not change the overall com-
plexion of the refugee system, but it is very important for it marks the first notable
constriction on refugee law in France and may point France in a new direction. See
Journal Officiel De La Republique Francaise 11035 (Sept. 12, 1986) (text of the change).
The law was first overturned by the Recours au Conseil constitutionnel as unconstitu-
tional, but was later changed to withstand constitutional scrutiny. See Etrangers, LIBER-
ATION, Aug. 14, 1986, at 6. Basically, the law sets out new stricter practices for border
agents to reject spurious claims and stop clandestine immigration. The new law seems to
contradict the extensive protection an applicant has from immediate expulsion at the
border. See Sexton, supra note 1, at 749-50.
151. Aleinikoff, supra note 41, at 217 n.122.
152. See Goodwin-Gill, supra note 64, at 310-11, and Foreign Laws Appendix, supra
note 76, at 565. A thin distinction exists between permanent asylum and refugee status.
See Sexton, supra note 1, at 775-76.
153. Cox, supra note 77, at 359, 360; see also LIBERTES PUBLIQUES, JURISPRUDENCE
AJDA 609 (Nov. 20, 1980) (discusses the claim of Black Panther activist Eldridge
Cleaver to refuge under the political persecution rubric); LIBERTIES PUBLIQUES, JURISPRU-
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De facto nonrefoulement (or refuge by default) occurs when
an applicant receives notice that her asylum claim has been de-
nied, for France will not forcibly remove or deport her. Thus, it
is often possible that a person unwilling to return to her country
of origin may be able to stay in France despite the denial of
refugee status.""
All applications for asylum are funneled to the Office Fran-
cais de Protection des Refugies et Apartrides (French Office for
the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons, "OFPRA"),
for processing and status determination.1 55 OFPRA is an inde-
pendent agency specializing in refugees and asylum, and is com-
posed of representatives from different ministries, and a repre-
sentative from the UNHCR who fulfills an observer/advisor
role. 15e Overall, most scholars and practitioners agree that OF-
PRA operates free of political interference and bias.
1 57
Appeal from an OFPRA decision denying asylum or refugee
status lies first with the Commission de Recours des Refugies
(de Recours) which is composed of a three member panel. 158 The
three members include a representative from OFPRA, a
UNHCR representative, and a member of the Counseil d'Etat
(the administrative Supreme Court).' 59 Most cases end at de
Recours, but an additional appeal to the Counseil d'Etat is pos-
sible. Review, however, is strictly limited to legal issues.'6 0 By
DENCE DROIT ADMINSTRATIF 481 (Sept. 20, 1983) (discussion of racial persecution).
The French take pride in the generosity of their asylum provisions. "The right of
asylum is secure. France has taken pride in it for two centuries. It will be strictly
respected. Candidates for refugee status can feel assured of guaranteed impartiality, un-
derstanding and assistance." M. Claude Cheysson, French Minister for External Rela-
tions, quoted in Cox, supra note 77, at 358 n.170.
154. Aleinikoff, supra note 41, at 222-23. If a person has applied for asylum, France
will not return that person to her country of origin. On occasion, however, France has
deported an applicant who is found to be a threat to the public order to a third country.
See Sexton, supra note 1, at 775.
155. Aleinikoff, supra note 41, at 215; see also Droit d'asile attention fragile,
CHRONIQUE 6 (Amnesty International Section Francaise, Feb. 1986).
156. Representatives include the ministers of justice, interior, finance, labor, and
health, and a representative of voluntary agencies. Aleinikoff, supra note 41, at 215-17;
see also Goodwin-Gill, supra note 64, at 310. The representatives usually have a back-
ground in law and human rights. Avery, supra note 65, at 290.
157. Aleinikoff, supra note 41, at 219.
158. Avery, supra note 65, at 291.
159. Cox, supra note 77, at 358. Appeals to the Commission de Recours take between
two and four years, during which time the appellant may remain in France. Id. at 359.
160. Aleinikoff, supra note 41, at 216-17.
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the end of both the OFPRA determination and the appeal pro-
cess, approximately 80% of the asylum claims are granted.1 1
While present French law on asylum is generous and apparently
impartial in application, observers worry that the new law will
begin a trend toward the politicization of the French process
and create a change in French policies toward human rights.
162
In fact, some French practices have been questioned recently by
the Counsel of Europe. 6 '
When faced with constrictions of French policies, refugee
advocates have turned to human rights law and the European
human rights institutions to prevent a degradation of refugees'
rights. By grounding refugee law in human rights, advocates
hope to sustain France's generous refugee policy and possibly
expand it.
How close the refugee definition used by the French is to
the fundamental rights approach definition of a refugee is not
clear. It appears that asylum applicants in France who fit within
the Convention definition of a refugee or those applicants fleeing
a coup or armed conflict are favored. However, France's de facto
nonrefoulement policy and possible support for a new interna-
tional definition of a refugee based on the deprivation of funda-
mental rights indicate France is moving toward an adoption of
the fundamental rights approach.""
It also appears that France recognizes a connection between
fundamental rights and refugee flow,"' but it is difficult to de-
termine to what extent that realization motivates French policy.
161. See id. at 217-219 (discussion of percentage of grants of asylum at each stage).
162. Sole, Les Etrangers dans le Co~limateur, Le Monde (Paris) May 31, 1986, at 9.
An example of the basis for the feeling of some commentators that the change indicates
a trend against France's historic commitment to human rights, the European Court of
Human Rights reprimanded France for the first time for a violation of human rights in
the summer of 1986. Fortier, La France est Condamnee par la Cour Europeenne des
Droits de I'Homme, Le Monde (Paris) July 20, 1986.
163. France has shown concern that French asylum policies do not meet the Counsel
of Europe's standards. Quatremer, Le Droit d'Asile dans la CEE, LIBERATION, Dec. 20,
1986.
164. See CHRONIQUE, 5-9 (Amnesty International Section Francaise, Feb. 1986) (call-
ing for France to lead Western Europe in adopting the fundamental rights (OAU-type)
definition, and citing France's support for the 1985 Amnesty resolution calling for a
broader definition of refugee).
165. A study by the French government correlated development in North Africa with
migration and refugee flow. See M. TREBOUS, MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT-THE CASE
OF ALGERIA (1970).
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France has spoken in terms of human rights and North-South
cooperation with respect to development but, for the most part,
developmental aid goes to former colonies and is connected to
strategic interests and political ties that may not contribute to
real development.'66 While the domestic side of French refugee
policy is leading the trend in effectively protecting fundamental
rights, French foreign policy is lagging behind in the ensurance
of fundamental rights for all people and the ultimate effect this
has on refugee flow.
Sweden
Sweden plays the role of world ombudsman in the area of
refugees. It focuses on providing assistance to those refugees
who have not yet received assistance from other states. 167 Many
scholars believe Sweden's program is politically biased,"" but it
can be argued that this bias exists in order to balance the bias
present in the refugee programs of other countries. 169 Until re-
cently the Nordic countries all had similar refugee admission
laws, which enjoyed popular support.170 The world economic sit-
uation has affected Nordic refugee policies, however, and the
policies are now undergoing revision in each of the Nordic coun-
tries.17 ' Some critics contend the charges are an outgrowth of
xenophobic tendencies growing in the Nordic countries.
172
Sweden is a party to the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Pro-
166. See Balta, French Policy in North Africa, 40 MIDDLE EAST J. 238 (1985);
Seiberg, Frankreichs Bindungen zur Dritten Welt Tradition, Wirtschaftinteresse, Pres-
tige, 19 Aus POLITIK UND ZEITGESCHICHTE 27 (May 11, 1985).
167. Currently, Sweden focuses on giving refuge to individuals from Latin America.
Telephone interview with Mr. Tilforcsh, Swedish Embassy, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 6,
1987). These actions could be perceived as a response to U.S. prejudice against Latin
American refugees.
168. E.g., Teitelbaum, supra note 69.
169. Avery, supra note 65, at 309.
170. Melander, Nordic Refugee Law and Policy, 1982 MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD.
229 [hereinafter Melander, Nordic Refugee Law].
171. For the first time, major differences are developing in refugee law and policy
among the Nordic countries. In 1986, Denmark amended its Aliens Act with the purpose
of constricting refugee admissions. Danish Aliens Act No. 226 (8 June 1983), amended by
Act No. 232 (6 June 1985), Act No. 574 (Dec. 1985), and Act. No. 686 (17 Oct. 1986)
(official English translation). The standard still meets the requirements under the Con-
vention. See, e.g., Rights and Duties of Refugees in Denmark (1985).
172. Letter from Carl Henrik Flach to Todd Howland (Nov. 12, 1986)(discussing
change in public opinion concerning refugees in the Nordic countries).
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tocol as well.1 73 The incorporation of the Convention into Swed-
ish law was a formality, since Sweden has a tradition that is
more generous than the minimum standard set out in the Con-
vention. 17' Before the passage of the new refugee law in 1980,
Sweden's law was generous, but very convoluted. 75
Refugee status or the right to remain in Sweden may be ob-
tained in four ways: 1) through the resettlement program; 2)
through the grant of refugee status or nonrefoulement; 3)
through a grant of de facto refugee status or b-status; or 4)
through the Ministry of Labor's prohibition of deportation. Be-
cause of Sweden's geographic location it is not usually the coun-
try of first refuge.1 76 Thus, probably the most important refugee
program is the resettlement program, and the Swedish Parlia-
ment annually adopts a quota for the admission of persons from
refugee camps.1 77 Applications for refugee status or nonrefoul-
ment may be made either at the Swedish border or from within
Sweden. Sweden respects the rights of asylum and nonrefoule-
ment,' 78 and the definitional standard applied to those attempt-
ing to gain refugee status is close to the Convention definition. 179
De facto refugee status or b-status is designed to assist peo-
ple who are not technically within the Convention definition, but
who are unwilling to return to their home country because of the
political situation or an armed conflict that exists there. 8 ' This
relief is usually granted as a normal option in the review of an
asylum application. When the Minister of Labor believes a coun-
try to be in an exceptional state of crisis, she can exercise her
discretionary authority and prohibit deportation to that
173. International Instruments Appendix, supra note 102, at 515, 521.
174. Broberg, Sweden and the Refugee Question, REPR. AWR. BULLETIN II, 23 (1973).
175. E.g., Melander, The Protection of Refugees, SCANDINAVIAN STUD. L. 151 (1979).
176. Melander, Nordic Refugee Law, supra note 170, at 229.
177. Foreign Laws Appendix, supra note 76, at 583.
178. Melander, Nordic Refugee Law, supra note 170, at 230.
179. Fear of persecution because of one of the enumerated factors in the Convention
(e.g., race, religion) is the standard applied in Sweden. Melander, Nordic Refugee Law,
supra note 170, at 233. The standard now seems to be tightening, to require that the fear
of persecution be life threatening. See Grahl-Madsen, World in Transition, supra note 5,
at 69-70.
180. The discussion is applicable to "[an alien . . . who, although not a refugee, is
unwilling to return to his home country on account of the political situation there, and is
able to plead powerful circumstances to this effect .... " Aliens Act § 6, cited in Me-
lander, Nordic Refugee Law, supra note 170, at 232.
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country.'81
An application for refugee status is made with the Alien Po-
lice, which forwards all reasonable claims for asylum and all
claims for nonrefoulement to the Central Immigration Board.8 2
The Board is partially autonomous, not affiliated with any par-
ticular ministry, and its membership is considered politically
balanced. 18 Both a finding by the Alien Police that a claim is
unfounded and a negative decision on refugee status by the
Board are appealable to the Immigration and Equity Division of
the Ministry of Labor. 84 The Division's decision is final.'85 Ap-
proximately 60% of the applications for refugee status eventu-
ally are successful.' s6
The definition of refugee applied to Sweden's applicants for
de facto refugee or b-status is considerably broader than a strict
construction of the Convention definition of refugee. 8 " It does
not, however, meet the fundamental rights approach. The b-sta-
tus program has been criticized,8 8 not because it is too generous,
but because it does not go far enough. A fundamental rights ap-
proach has been offered as the alternative. 89
Sweden has been very supportive of the internationalization
181. Avery, supra note 65, at 305. Lebanon recently has been added to the list of
countries to which deportation is not allowed.
182. The controversy over the legitimacy and fairness of the presceening process by
the Alien Police, has resulted in a change of practice. See Avery, supra note 65, at 304.
183. There is no UNHCR representative on the Board, perhaps as a result of the low
influx of refugees, given Sweden's geographic location. Occasionally, advice has been
sought from the UNHCR and applied in individual cases. See Avery, supra note 65, at
305, 307-08.
184. See Foreign Laws Appendix, supra note 76, at 583; see also Melander, Nordic
Refugee Law, supra note 170, at 242-43.
185. The Division may collect more information, and occasionally will ask the Alien
Police to re-interview the applicant. See Avery, supra note 65, at 307.
186. The Board originally accepts only 30% of the applications. The Division
reverses about 45% of the Board's refusals. Id.
187. Sweden considers itself bound to the Geneva Convention of 1949 and has shown
an unwillingness to repatriate individuals to a zone of armed conflict. Unfortunately,
Sweden has also exhibited a tendency to redefine a situation in order to meet its interna-
tional obligations, as opposed to changing its practice to reflect reality. For example,
Sweden declared the conflict in Lebanon to be over before deporting Lebanese to their
home country. See Perluss & Hartman, supra note 2, at 565.
188. See Melander, Nordic Refugee Law, supra note 170, at 235.
189. "A refugee shall not without grave reasons be refused asylum in Sweden when
he has need of such protection." § 3 of the Aliens Act, quoted in Foreign Laws Appen-
dix, supra note 76, at 582. See also Grahl-Madsen, supra note 5, at 71.
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of the refugee problem. Although Sweden's self-appointed task
of balancing world refugee acceptance has created legitimate in-
ternal complaints,190 its efforts to internationalize the refugee
problem have been praised.19'
Sweden recognizes the interdependence of countries, 192 and
has expressed as a goal for its developmental aid to "increase
wealth, economic and social equalization, and support demo-
cratic change toward national and economic independence."' 9
Although some have criticized the implementation of these goals
as overlooking certain worldwide problems, overall the Swedish
approach to foreign policy is to facilitate the realization of fun-
damental rights.
9 4
Sweden's domestic refugee policy, while relatively generous,
is not moving very rapidly toward a fundamental rights ap-
proach. Rather, Sweden's foreign policy is attempting to allevi-
ate refugee flow at its source, the deprivation of fundamental
rights.
CONCLUSION
The refugee problem has two aspects: refugee creation and
refugee acceptance. Little work has been done in the area of ref-
ugee creation and its link to foreign policy. To a large extent this
is so because the international definition of a refugee points to a
specific problem: individual political persecution. This definition
misstates the current reality of the causes of refugee flows, the
deprivation of fundamental human rights. While ensuring fun-
damental rights is not a simple task, applying the concept to the
190. For a discussion of possible country bias influencing asylum decisions, see Avery,
supra note 65, at 308-09.
191. E.g., Melander, Nordic Refugee Law, supra note 170, at 229. The contributions
of the Nordic countries to the UNHCR make up 22% of the Commission's total budget.
Id.
192. Sundelius, Interdependence, Internationalization and Foreign Policy Decen-
tralization in Sweden, 19 CooP. & CONFLICT 93 (1984).
193. Rudebeck, Swedish Development Aid in Times of Economic Realities, 72(4)
SCANDINAVIAN REV. 49 (1984).
194. One scholar finds the Swedish goals laudable, but believes more attention must
be paid by Sweden to the structures that create underdevelopment and conflict (e.g.,
trade dependencies and world financing). See Jinadu, The Political Economy of Swe-
den's Development Policy in Africa, 19 CooP. & CONFLICT 177 (1984); see also E.
MICHANEK, THE WORLD DEVELOPMENT PLAN-A SWEDISH PERSPECTIVE (1971) (Sweden's
ideas of international social justice).
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refugee problem reframes the problem in such a way as to high-
light its dual aspects.
This comparison has investigated the extent to which states
have shed the inadequate definition of a refugee contained in
the international instruments that protect refugees and ex-
amined the extent of movement toward a new, more reflective
definition, one that can handle effectively the synergistic nature
of a refugee. 95 A new workable definition is one that is grounded
in human rights law, in order to avoid the difficulties presented
by sovereignty and the sovereign privilege of granting the "right
to asylum." The rights that must be discussed are a person's
fundamental rights, including the right to refuge when the nec-
essary social fabric of one's homeland disintegrates.
Many states are drifting in a direction that may realistically
lead to a better world, but some states are legitimizing their
straggling positions by pointing to the international legal defini-
tions of a refugee. It is time that international law in this field
regains its place so that, when achieved, it will contribute posi-
tively to a just world order, as opposed to exacerbating an unjust
one.
195. The Convention definition and other legal protections for refugees attempt to
create a legal category that recognizes a person as a refugee if the enumerated circum-
stance causes a refugee to flee. There are many factors which cause a person to flee. For
example, a person from El Salvador could flee because: 1) there is a war going on and the
person does not want to get caught in the cross-fire; 2) membership in an opposition
political party makes the person susceptible to political persecution; 3) conditions have
deteriorated to such an extent in her country that there is no longer adequate work to be
found. The list could go on, but the point is that it is the totality of the circumstances,
not just one factor, that causes or creates a refugee. Only the fundamental rights ap-
proach adequately accounts for this synergistic causation.
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